Sourced Facts & Statistics
Every headline statistic in We Actually Can All Get Along, with its primary source, publication date, and the chapter it appears in. Free to cite with attribution.
Claims and citations
Public trust in U.S. mass media was 68% in 1972, a record-low 28% in 2025, and 33% in 2026.
Gallup's long-running "Trust and Confidence in Mass Media" survey shows a structural decline tracking the transition from broadcast scarcity to digital abundance.
Source: Gallup (2026-09). Appears in Introduction & Chapter 1.
In 2025, 32% of U.S. adults say they often get news from television and 27% from news websites or apps, against 21% from social media.
Pew Research Center, News Platform Fact Sheet, fielded August 18 to 24, 2025. Search reads 19%, radio 11%, and podcasts 10%. Television has fallen from 40% in 2020 while podcasts have risen from 6%.
Source: Pew Research Center, News Platform Fact Sheet (2025-09). Appears in Chapter 7.
Trust in the information from national news organizations fell from 77% in 2016 to 58% in 2024, with local news organizations consistently higher.
Pew Research Center tracking of a lot or some trust. Local news organizations read 82% in 2016 and 74% in 2024, while social media sites moved from 34% to 37%. A September 2025 wave reported 56% for national and 70% for local.
Source: Pew Research Center, trust in information from news organizations and social media (2025-10). Appears in Chapter 1.
False news on Twitter was ~70% more likely to be retweeted than true news and reached the first 1,500 people roughly six times faster.
Vosoughi, Roy & Aral (Science, 2018), falsehoods spread further primarily because they were more novel and more emotionally charged.
Source: Vosoughi, Roy & Aral, Science (MIT) (2018-03). Appears in Chapter 6 · Answer: Attention Economy.
Humans detect AI-generated faces at only 59% accuracy even after training with feedback, statistically near chance.
Nightingale & Farid (PNAS, 2022), synthetic StyleGAN2 faces were rated as more trustworthy than real faces, and untrained observers performed at chance level (48.2%). Feedback training only lifted accuracy to 59%.
Source: Nightingale & Farid, PNAS (Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences) (2022-02). Appears in Chapter 11 · Answer: Liar's Dividend.
45% of Democrats and 35% of Republicans said they would be unhappy if their child married someone from the other political party.
PRRI 2019 American Values Survey, a partisan cross-party marriage-discomfort measure (not a religious/interfaith marriage measure). The framing is negative valence (unhappy), not support.
Source: PRRI, 2019 American Values Survey (2019-10). Appears in Introduction.
The share of Americans viewing the opposing party as a threat to the nation more than doubled between the mid-1990s and 2022.
Pew Research Center tracking of partisan hostility, the "threat to the nation" wording matches Pew's question, not a general "dislike" measure.
Source: Pew Research Center, partisan hostility tracking (2022-08). Appears in Chapter 1.
After the Telecommunications Act of 1996 removed the national radio ownership cap, Clear Channel Communications grew from roughly 40 stations in 1995 to more than 1,200 by 2005, the specific consolidation the ownership-cap change made possible.
The 1996 Act eliminated the 40-station national cap on radio ownership. Clear Channel's station count is the most-cited direct consequence; the Future of Music Coalition's radio-deregulation studies document the specific ownership-cap change and its measured effect on station-count concentration.
Source: Future of Music Coalition, "Radio Deregulation: Has It Served Citizens and Musicians?" (2006-12). Appears in Chapter 5.
Trust in the federal government to do what is right most of the time or just about always fell from 73% in 1958 to 17% in 2025.
Pew Research Center pools readings from several survey houses across the full series, so year-to-year moves carry house effects. The September 2025 reading is 17%.
Source: Pew Research Center, Public Trust in Government 1958-2025 (2025-09). Appears in Chapter 1.
A record 45% of Americans identified as political independents in 2025, against 27% Republican and 27% Democratic.
Gallup annual aggregate of telephone polls, 13,454 interviews. Among Gen Z adults, 56% identify as independent, higher than millennials or Gen X at the same age. Leaned identification is a separate Gallup measure and is not carried here.
Source: Gallup, Party Affiliation annual aggregate (2026-01). Appears in Chapter 15.
Average confidence across 14 major U.S. institutions stood at 27% in 2026, near the 26% record low set in 2023.
Gallup Confidence in Institutions, fielded each June. The 2026 average sits one point above the 26% record low set in 2023.
Source: Gallup, Confidence in Institutions (2026-07). Appears in Chapter 12.
The partisan gap in average confidence in major U.S. institutions stood at 13 points in 2026, as wide as any gap in nearly five decades of measurement.
Gallup describes the 2026 gap as similar to the 2025 gap of 11 points and does not declare a new record. The margin of error is about 4 points on roughly 1,001 adults, so the two readings should be read as flat rather than rising. The gap measures the spread between the parties, not the confidence level of either one, and its direction flips with control of the White House.
Source: Gallup, Confidence in Institutions (2026-07). Appears in Chapter 12.
Reported voter turnout among U.S. citizens age 18 and over was 59.3% in 2024, down from 61.3% in 2020.
Census Bureau Current Population Survey Table A-1. These are self-reported figures and run above administrative turnout counts.
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Voting and Registration (Table A-1) (2025). Appears in Chapter 15.
Partisans estimate that 55% of the other side holds extreme views. The measured share is about 30%.
More in Common, The Perception Gap (2019), fielded with YouGov. This measures misperception of what opponents believe, not what opponents actually believe. Both sides imagine almost twice as many extremists as exist, and the gap is widest among the most politically engaged.
Source: More in Common, The Perception Gap (2019-06). Appears in Chapter 14.
Data series
Share of U.S. adults who often get news from each platform
| Year | Value | Provenance |
|---|---|---|
| 2020 | Television 40 · News websites or apps 34 · Search 23 · Social media 23 · Radio 16 · Podcasts 6 (percent of U.S. adults) | verified |
| 2021 | Television 36 · News websites or apps 28 · Search 20 · Social media 19 · Radio 15 · Podcasts 7 (percent of U.S. adults) | verified |
| 2022 | Television 31 · News websites or apps 25 · Search 18 · Social media 17 · Radio 13 · Podcasts 6 (percent of U.S. adults) | verified |
| 2023 | Television 32 · News websites or apps 29 · Search 27 · Social media 19 · Radio 16 · Podcasts 9 (percent of U.S. adults) | verified |
| 2024 | Television 33 · News websites or apps 29 · Search 23 · Social media 25 · Radio 11 · Podcasts 9 (percent of U.S. adults) | verified |
| 2025 | Television 32 · News websites or apps 27 · Search 19 · Social media 21 · Radio 11 · Podcasts 10 (percent of U.S. adults) | verified |
Pew Research Center, News Platform Fact Sheet, published September 25, 2025 and fielded August 18 to 24, 2025. Values are the share saying they often get news that way, so the lines do not sum to 100 and a respondent can appear on several lines. Print is not plotted because the item wording changed, it was asked as print publications from 2020 to 2024, reading 10, 10, 8, 9 and 6 percent, then as printed newspapers or magazines in 2025, reading 7 percent. Email newsletters and AI chatbots were first asked in 2025, at 6 and 2 percent, so they carry no trend. Adults who do not use the internet were not asked the digital items and are counted with those who said never.
Primary source: Pew Research Center, News Platform Fact Sheet (September 25, 2025)
Share with a lot or some trust in the information from each source
| Year | Value | Provenance |
|---|---|---|
| 2016 | Local news organizations 82 · National news organizations 77 · Social media sites 34 (percent of U.S. adults) | verified |
| 2017 | Local news organizations 85 · National news organizations 72 · Social media sites 35 (percent of U.S. adults) | verified |
| 2018 | Local news organizations 83 · National news organizations 70 · Social media sites 33 (percent of U.S. adults) | verified |
| 2019 | Local news organizations 78 · National news organizations 66 · Social media sites 27 (percent of U.S. adults) | verified |
| 2021 | Local news organizations 75 · National news organizations 58 · Social media sites 26 (percent of U.S. adults) | verified |
| 2022 | Local news organizations 71 · National news organizations 61 · Social media sites 33 (percent of U.S. adults) | verified |
| 2024 | Local news organizations 74 · National news organizations 58 · Social media sites 37 (percent of U.S. adults) | verified |
| 2025 | Local news organizations 80 · National news organizations 67 · Social media sites 42 (percent of U.S. adults) | verified |
Pew Research Center tracking of trust in information, 2016 through 2025. Each value combines a lot and some trust. Years without a published reading are left as gaps rather than filled. Pew fielded the question twice in 2019, in July reading 75 national, 86 local and 39 social, and again in October and November reading 66, 78 and 27, and the later fielding is the one plotted. The 2025 point is the March 10 to 16 wave. A later wave fielded September 8 to 14, 2025 reported 56 percent for national and 70 percent for local, with the social media figure not itemized in the published topline, so that wave is not plotted. The social media item wording changed across waves as named platforms changed, and in 2016 it was asked of web users only.
Primary source: Pew Research Center, trust in information from news organizations and social media sites
Would be unhappy if their child married across party lines
| Year | Value | Provenance |
|---|---|---|
| 1960 | Democrats 4 · Republicans 5 (percent of partisans) | Almond & Verba, The Civic Culture — "displeased" |
| 2008 | Democrats 20 · Republicans 27 (percent of partisans) | YouGov (Iyengar, Sood & Lelkes 2012) — "somewhat/very upset" |
| 2010 | Democrats 33 · Republicans 49 (percent of partisans) | YouGov 11-nation (Iyengar et al. 2012) — "somewhat/very unhappy" |
| 2019 | Democrats 45 · Republicans 35 (percent of partisans) | PRRI American Values Survey — "unhappy" |
| 2024 | Democrats 45 · Republicans 40 (percent of partisans) | YouGov (Mar 28-Apr 4, 2024 topline) — "somewhat/very upset" |
Different survey organizations and wordings across points ('displeased' 1960, 'upset' 2008/2010, 'unhappy' 2019). Party ordering flips between houses (2010 YouGov: R higher; 2019 PRRI: D higher), a house/wording effect, not a documented reversal. Every point is labeled with its source.
Primary source: PRRI, 2019 American Values Survey
Trust in mass media (great deal / fair amount)
| Year | Value | Provenance |
|---|---|---|
| 1972 | 68 percent of U.S. adults | verified |
| 1976 | 72 percent of U.S. adults | verified |
| 1997 | 53 percent of U.S. adults | verified |
| 1998 | 55 percent of U.S. adults | verified |
| 1999 | 55 percent of U.S. adults | verified |
| 2000 | 51 percent of U.S. adults | verified |
| 2001 | 53 percent of U.S. adults | verified |
| 2002 | 54 percent of U.S. adults | verified |
| 2003 | 54 percent of U.S. adults | verified |
| 2004 | 44 percent of U.S. adults | verified |
| 2005 | 50 percent of U.S. adults | verified |
| 2007 | 47 percent of U.S. adults | verified |
| 2008 | 43 percent of U.S. adults | verified |
| 2009 | 45 percent of U.S. adults | verified |
| 2010 | 43 percent of U.S. adults | verified |
| 2011 | 44 percent of U.S. adults | verified |
| 2012 | 40 percent of U.S. adults | verified |
| 2013 | 44 percent of U.S. adults | verified |
| 2014 | 40 percent of U.S. adults | verified |
| 2015 | 40 percent of U.S. adults | verified |
| 2016 | 32 percent of U.S. adults | verified |
| 2017 | 41 percent of U.S. adults | verified |
| 2018 | 45 percent of U.S. adults | verified |
| 2019 | 41 percent of U.S. adults | verified |
| 2020 | 40 percent of U.S. adults | verified |
| 2021 | 36 percent of U.S. adults | verified |
| 2022 | 34 percent of U.S. adults | verified |
| 2023 | 32 percent of U.S. adults | verified |
| 2024 | 31 percent of U.S. adults | verified |
| 2025 | 28 percent of U.S. adults | verified |
| 2026 | 33 percent of U.S. adults | verified |
Gallup fielded this question annually from 1997 onward (skipped 2006). Two pre-1997 anchor readings (1972, 1976) show the historical peak. Every rendered year is verified against Gallup's primary trend PDF; see the verification ledger for source quotes.
Primary source: Gallup, Media Use and Evaluation trend
Partisans rating the opposing party at 0 (coldest) on the 0-100 feeling thermometer
| Year | Value | Provenance |
|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 21 percent of partisans | verified |
| 2020 | 40 percent of partisans | verified |
Rendered as a deliberate two-point series (2016 → 2020) because these are the only ANES cycles restated numerically in peer-reviewed text (Iyengar & Krupenkin 2018 for 2016; Tyler & Iyengar 2023 APSR for 2020). Interior cycles 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2012 exist only as points on Iyengar & Krupenkin (2018) Figure 3 and are intentionally omitted from the chart to hold every rendered point to a text-verified tier. No interpolation.
Primary source: Iyengar & Krupenkin (2018) / Tyler & Iyengar (2023), ANES exact-zero out-party thermometer share (text-verified endpoints only)
U.S. adults who regularly get news on TikTok
| Year | Value | Provenance |
|---|---|---|
| 2020 | 3 percent of U.S. adults | verified |
| 2022 | 10 percent of U.S. adults | verified |
| 2023 | 14 percent of U.S. adults | verified |
| 2024 | 17 percent of U.S. adults | verified |
| 2025 | 20 percent of U.S. adults | verified |
Every year is verified against a Pew publication: 2020 baseline fact sheet, 2022 News Consumption Across Social Media report, 2023 finding restated in Pew's 2024 TikTok study, 2024 Short Read (Jan 2025), 2025 Social Media and News Fact Sheet.
Primary source: Pew Research Center, Social Media and News Fact Sheet (2025)
"Most people can be trusted", General Social Survey
| Year | Value | Provenance |
|---|---|---|
| 1972 | 46 percent of U.S. adults | verified |
| 1980 | 44 percent of U.S. adults | verified |
| 1990 | 38 percent of U.S. adults | verified |
| 2000 | 35 percent of U.S. adults | verified |
| 2010 | 32 percent of U.S. adults | verified |
| 2018 | 32 percent of U.S. adults | verified |
GSS "trust" variable, weighted (WTSSCOMP), simple random sample assumption, extracted from NORC GSS Data Explorer. Six waves shown; intermediate waves omitted only when a Tier-A extraction was not on hand. 2020/2022 waves not yet verified against a primary source.
Primary source: NORC, General Social Survey Data Explorer, "trust" variable
"Very unfavorable" view of the other party (Pew Research)
| Year | Value | Provenance |
|---|---|---|
| 1994 | Democrats 16 · Republicans 17 (percent of partisans) | Pew, "Political Polarization in the American Public" (2014) — "very unfavorable" |
| 2002 | Democrats 26 · Republicans 20 (percent of partisans) | Pew, "Rising Partisan Antipathy" (2022) restating 2002 comparison — "very unfavorable" |
| 2012 | Democrats 46 · Republicans 43 (percent of partisans) | Pew, "Rising Partisan Antipathy" (2022) restating 2012 comparison — "very unfavorable" |
| 2022 | Democrats 54 · Republicans 62 (percent of partisans) | Pew, "As Partisan Hostility Grows..." (Aug 9, 2022) — "very unfavorable" |
Pew Research Center's cross-year comparison in its 2022 partisan-hostility report. Points shown are years Pew restates numerically in text; intermediate 2016 and 2019 waves are documented separately in Pew reports but not yet verified against primary text in the current ledger.
Primary source: Pew Research Center, Rising Partisan Antipathy (2022)
Split-ticket U.S. House districts (President vs. House winner)
| Year | Value | Provenance |
|---|---|---|
| 1972 | 44 percent of House districts | verified |
| 1976 | 29 percent of House districts | verified |
| 1980 | 33 percent of House districts | verified |
| 1984 | 44 percent of House districts | verified |
| 1988 | 34 percent of House districts | verified |
| 1992 | 24 percent of House districts | verified |
| 1996 | 25 percent of House districts | verified |
| 2000 | 20 percent of House districts | verified |
| 2004 | 14 percent of House districts | verified |
| 2008 | 19 percent of House districts | verified |
| 2012 | 6 percent of House districts | verified |
| 2016 | 8 percent of House districts | verified |
| 2020 | 4 percent of House districts | verified |
Presidential-year congressional districts carried by a presidential candidate of one party and a House candidate of the other. Brookings Vital Statistics on Congress, Table 2-16, updated Nov 2024. Runs 1972-2020; 2024 not yet published in this table.
Primary source: Brookings, Vital Statistics on Congress, Table 2-16 (Nov 2024)
Public laws enacted per Congress
| Year | Value | Provenance |
|---|---|---|
| 1973 | 772 laws enacted (per 2-year Congress) | verified |
| 1987 | 761 laws enacted (per 2-year Congress) | verified |
| 2007 | 460 laws enacted (per 2-year Congress) | verified |
| 2017 | 443 laws enacted (per 2-year Congress) | verified |
| 2021 | 365 laws enacted (per 2-year Congress) | verified |
| 2023 | 274 laws enacted (per 2-year Congress) | verified |
GovTrack.us "Enacted Legislation" column by Congress. GovTrack notes that fewer, larger bills mean lower counts do not necessarily indicate less legislative activity, chart shows raw law counts only. Year axis uses the first year of each Congress.
Primary source: GovTrack.us, Statistics and Historical Comparison
Trust the government in Washington to do what is right (just about always / most of the time)
| Year | Value | Provenance |
|---|---|---|
| 1958 | 73 percent of U.S. adults | verified · NES |
| 1964 | 77 percent of U.S. adults | verified · NES |
| 1966 | 65 percent of U.S. adults | verified · NES |
| 1968 | 62 percent of U.S. adults | verified · NES |
| 1970 | 54 percent of U.S. adults | verified · NES |
| 1972 | 53 percent of U.S. adults | verified · NES |
| 1974 | 36 percent of U.S. adults | verified · NES |
| 1976 | 33 percent of U.S. adults | verified · NES |
| 1977 | 33 percent of U.S. adults | verified · CBS/NYT |
| 1978 | 29 percent of U.S. adults | verified · NES |
| 1979 | 30 percent of U.S. adults | verified · CBS/NYT |
| 1980 | 25 percent of U.S. adults | verified · NES |
| 1982 | 33 percent of U.S. adults | verified · NES |
| 1984 | 44 percent of U.S. adults | verified · NES |
| 1985 | 49 percent of U.S. adults | verified · CBS/NYT |
| 1986 | 39 percent of U.S. adults | verified · NES |
| 1987 | 41 percent of U.S. adults | verified · CBS/NYT |
| 1988 | 41 percent of U.S. adults | verified · NES |
| 1989 | 35 percent of U.S. adults | verified · CBS/NYT |
| 1990 | 28 percent of U.S. adults | verified · NES |
| 1991 | 47 percent of U.S. adults | verified · CBS/NYT |
| 1992 | 29 percent of U.S. adults | verified · NES |
| 1993 | 22 percent of U.S. adults | verified · GALLUP |
| 1994 | 22 percent of U.S. adults | verified · NES |
| 1995 | 22 percent of U.S. adults | verified · GALLUP |
| 1996 | 33 percent of U.S. adults | verified · NES |
| 1997 | 39 percent of U.S. adults | verified · Pew Research Center |
| 1998 | 26 percent of U.S. adults | verified · Pew Research Center |
| 1999 | 31 percent of U.S. adults | verified · Pew Research Center |
| 2000 | 40 percent of U.S. adults | verified · Pew Research Center |
| 2001 | 60 percent of U.S. adults | verified · GALLUP |
| 2002 | 55 percent of U.S. adults | verified · NES |
| 2003 | 37 percent of U.S. adults | verified · GALLUP |
| 2004 | 36 percent of U.S. adults | verified · Pew Research Center |
| 2005 | 31 percent of U.S. adults | verified · Pew Research Center |
| 2006 | 34 percent of U.S. adults | verified · Pew Research Center |
| 2007 | 31 percent of U.S. adults | verified · Pew Research Center |
| 2008 | 31 percent of U.S. adults | verified · NES |
| 2009 | 24 percent of U.S. adults | verified · CBS/NYT |
| 2010 | 24 percent of U.S. adults | verified · Pew Research Center |
| 2011 | 20 percent of U.S. adults | verified · Pew Research Center |
| 2012 | 22 percent of U.S. adults | verified · NES |
| 2013 | 19 percent of U.S. adults | verified · Pew Research Center |
| 2014 | 24 percent of U.S. adults | verified · Pew Research Center |
| 2015 | 19 percent of U.S. adults | verified · Pew Research Center |
| 2017 | 18 percent of U.S. adults | verified · Pew Research Center |
| 2019 | 17 percent of U.S. adults | verified · Pew Research Center |
| 2020 | 20 percent of U.S. adults | verified · Pew Research Center |
| 2021 | 24 percent of U.S. adults | verified · Pew Research Center |
| 2022 | 20 percent of U.S. adults | verified · Pew Research Center |
| 2023 | 16 percent of U.S. adults | verified · Pew Research Center |
| 2024 | 22 percent of U.S. adults | verified · Pew Research Center |
| 2025 | 17 percent of U.S. adults | verified · Pew Research Center |
Pooled trend. Pew Research Center publishes this as a combined series drawing on Pew, National Election Studies, Gallup, ABC/Washington Post, CBS/New York Times, and CNN surveys, so every point is labeled with the house that fielded it. One reading per year, selected by a fixed house preference order (Pew, NES, Gallup, CBS/NYT, ABC/Post, CNN) and, where a house fielded more than once in a year, the later reading. Values are individual polls, not the smoothed three-survey moving average Pew draws on its chart. Years with no reading in the published table stay missing.
Primary source: Pew Research Center, Public Trust in Government: 1958-2025 (Dec 2025)
Party identification, Gallup annual averages
| Year | Value | Provenance |
|---|---|---|
| 2014 | Independent 43 · Democrat no reading · Republican no reading (percent of U.S. adults) | verified |
| 2016 | Independent 39 · Democrat no reading · Republican no reading (percent of U.S. adults) | verified |
| 2018 | Independent 42 · Democrat 30 · Republican 26 (percent of U.S. adults) | verified |
| 2020 | Independent 39 · Democrat no reading · Republican no reading (percent of U.S. adults) | verified |
| 2021 | Independent 42 · Democrat 29 · Republican 27 (percent of U.S. adults) | verified |
| 2023 | Independent 43 · Democrat 27 · Republican 27 (percent of U.S. adults) | verified |
| 2024 | Independent 43 · Democrat no reading · Republican no reading (percent of U.S. adults) | verified |
| 2025 | Independent 45 · Democrat 27 · Republican 27 (percent of U.S. adults) | verified |
Gallup annual averages built from every Gallup telephone poll fielded that year (13,000-plus interviews in 2025). Only years Gallup restates numerically in published text are plotted. Where Gallup restated the independent share for a year without restating the Democratic and Republican shares, the missing lines stay missing rather than being interpolated. Leaned party preference is a separate Gallup measure and is not plotted here.
Primary source: Gallup, New High of 45% in U.S. Identify as Political Independents (Jan 2026)
Average confidence in 14 major U.S. institutions
| Year | Value | Provenance |
|---|---|---|
| 2022 | 27 percent expressing a great deal or quite a lot of confidence | verified |
| 2023 | 26 percent expressing a great deal or quite a lot of confidence | verified |
| 2026 | 27 percent expressing a great deal or quite a lot of confidence | verified |
Gallup fields this battery each June and reports the average across the 14 institutions tracked since 1993. Only readings Gallup restates numerically in published text are plotted, so the interior years of a trend that runs to 1993 are absent rather than interpolated. The 2023 value is the record low the 2026 release names one point below the current reading. Gallup also publishes a nine-institution average tracked since 1979. The 2026 release text does not restate that figure numerically, so it is not carried here.
Primary source: Gallup, Confidence in U.S. Institutions Remains Near All-Time Low (July 2026)
Partisan gap in average confidence in major U.S. institutions
| Year | Value | Provenance |
|---|---|---|
| 2025 | 11 percentage points between the higher-confidence and lower-confidence party | verified |
| 2026 | 13 percentage points between the higher-confidence and lower-confidence party | verified |
Gallup reports the spread between Republican and Democratic average confidence alongside the overall average each July. Only the two readings the July 2026 release restates numerically are plotted. Gallup describes the 2026 gap as similar to the 2025 gap and does not declare a new record, and the release carries a margin of error of about 4 points on a sample of roughly 1,001 adults, so the two-year move should be read as flat rather than as a rise. The direction of the gap flips with control of the White House, which is the point of the measure, so a larger number means a wider partisan split and not higher confidence for either side. Independent confidence is described in the same release as persistently low across administrations. The release does not restate an independent figure numerically for either year, so no independent line is plotted.
Primary source: Gallup, Confidence in U.S. Institutions Remains Near All-Time Low (July 2026)
U.S. adults who regularly get news on each social media site
| Year | Value | Provenance |
|---|---|---|
| 2020 | Facebook 36 · YouTube 23 · Instagram 11 · TikTok 3 (percent of U.S. adults) | verified |
| 2021 | Facebook 31 · YouTube 22 · Instagram 11 · TikTok 6 (percent of U.S. adults) | verified |
| 2022 | Facebook 31 · YouTube 25 · Instagram 13 · TikTok 10 (percent of U.S. adults) | verified |
| 2023 | Facebook 30 · YouTube 26 · Instagram 16 · TikTok 14 (percent of U.S. adults) | verified |
| 2024 | Facebook 33 · YouTube 32 · Instagram 20 · TikTok 17 (percent of U.S. adults) | verified |
| 2025 | Facebook 38 · YouTube 35 · Instagram 20 · TikTok 20 (percent of U.S. adults) | verified |
Pew Research Center, Social Media and News Fact Sheet, annual since 2020. Values come from the published underlying data file, not from a chart reading. Capped at the four highest platforms in the 2025 reading; smaller platforms in the same file are omitted for legibility, not for sourcing reasons. Only respondents who use a site were asked whether they regularly get news on it.
Primary source: Pew Research Center, Social Media and News Fact Sheet (Sept 2025)
Reported voting rate, November elections
| Year | Value | Provenance |
|---|---|---|
| 1964 | 69.3 percent of the total voting-age population | verified |
| 1966 | 55.4 percent of the total voting-age population | verified |
| 1968 | 67.8 percent of the total voting-age population | verified |
| 1970 | 54.6 percent of the total voting-age population | verified |
| 1972 | 63 percent of the total voting-age population | verified |
| 1974 | 44.7 percent of the total voting-age population | verified |
| 1976 | 59.2 percent of the total voting-age population | verified |
| 1978 | 45.9 percent of the total voting-age population | verified |
| 1980 | 59.2 percent of the total voting-age population | verified |
| 1982 | 48.5 percent of the total voting-age population | verified |
| 1984 | 59.9 percent of the total voting-age population | verified |
| 1986 | 46 percent of the total voting-age population | verified |
| 1988 | 57.4 percent of the total voting-age population | verified |
| 1990 | 45 percent of the total voting-age population | verified |
| 1992 | 61.3 percent of the total voting-age population | verified |
| 1994 | 45 percent of the total voting-age population | verified |
| 1996 | 54.2 percent of the total voting-age population | verified |
| 1998 | 41.9 percent of the total voting-age population | verified |
| 2000 | 54.7 percent of the total voting-age population | verified |
| 2002 | 42.3 percent of the total voting-age population | verified |
| 2004 | 58.3 percent of the total voting-age population | verified |
| 2006 | 43.6 percent of the total voting-age population | verified |
| 2008 | 58.2 percent of the total voting-age population | verified |
| 2010 | 41.8 percent of the total voting-age population | verified |
| 2012 | 56.5 percent of the total voting-age population | verified |
| 2014 | 38.5 percent of the total voting-age population | verified |
| 2016 | 56 percent of the total voting-age population | verified |
| 2018 | 49 percent of the total voting-age population | verified |
| 2020 | 61.3 percent of the total voting-age population | verified |
| 2022 | 47.7 percent of the total voting-age population | verified |
| 2024 | 59.3 percent of the total voting-age population | verified |
U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey November Voting and Registration Supplement, Table A-1, November 1964 to 2024. Self-reported voting, which runs above validated turnout. Values are the total voting-age population base, held constant across all years for comparability, rather than the citizen-population base the Census reports only from 1978 onward. Presidential and midterm years alternate, so the sawtooth is the election calendar, not a trend.
Primary source: U.S. Census Bureau, Historical Reported Voting Rates, Table A-1 (2024)
Reported registration versus reported voting, November elections
| Year | Value | Provenance |
|---|---|---|
| 1964 | Registered no reading · Voted 69.3 (percent of the total voting-age population) | verified |
| 1966 | Registered 70.3 · Voted 55.4 (percent of the total voting-age population) | verified |
| 1968 | Registered 74.3 · Voted 67.8 (percent of the total voting-age population) | verified |
| 1970 | Registered 68.1 · Voted 54.6 (percent of the total voting-age population) | verified |
| 1972 | Registered 72.3 · Voted 63 (percent of the total voting-age population) | verified |
| 1974 | Registered 62.2 · Voted 44.7 (percent of the total voting-age population) | verified |
| 1976 | Registered 66.7 · Voted 59.2 (percent of the total voting-age population) | verified |
| 1978 | Registered 62.6 · Voted 45.9 (percent of the total voting-age population) | verified |
| 1980 | Registered 66.9 · Voted 59.2 (percent of the total voting-age population) | verified |
| 1982 | Registered 64.1 · Voted 48.5 (percent of the total voting-age population) | verified |
| 1984 | Registered 68.3 · Voted 59.9 (percent of the total voting-age population) | verified |
| 1986 | Registered 64.3 · Voted 46 (percent of the total voting-age population) | verified |
| 1988 | Registered 66.6 · Voted 57.4 (percent of the total voting-age population) | verified |
| 1990 | Registered 62.2 · Voted 45 (percent of the total voting-age population) | verified |
| 1992 | Registered 68.2 · Voted 61.3 (percent of the total voting-age population) | verified |
| 1994 | Registered 62.5 · Voted 45 (percent of the total voting-age population) | verified |
| 1996 | Registered 65.9 · Voted 54.2 (percent of the total voting-age population) | verified |
| 1998 | Registered 62.1 · Voted 41.9 (percent of the total voting-age population) | verified |
| 2000 | Registered 63.9 · Voted 54.7 (percent of the total voting-age population) | verified |
| 2002 | Registered 60.9 · Voted 42.3 (percent of the total voting-age population) | verified |
| 2004 | Registered 65.9 · Voted 58.3 (percent of the total voting-age population) | verified |
| 2006 | Registered 61.6 · Voted 43.6 (percent of the total voting-age population) | verified |
| 2008 | Registered 64.9 · Voted 58.2 (percent of the total voting-age population) | verified |
| 2010 | Registered 59.8 · Voted 41.8 (percent of the total voting-age population) | verified |
| 2012 | Registered 65.1 · Voted 56.5 (percent of the total voting-age population) | verified |
| 2014 | Registered 59.3 · Voted 38.5 (percent of the total voting-age population) | verified |
| 2016 | Registered 64.2 · Voted 56 (percent of the total voting-age population) | verified |
| 2018 | Registered 61.3 · Voted 49 (percent of the total voting-age population) | verified |
| 2020 | Registered 66.7 · Voted 61.3 (percent of the total voting-age population) | verified |
| 2022 | Registered 63.2 · Voted 47.7 (percent of the total voting-age population) | verified |
| 2024 | Registered 66.8 · Voted 59.3 (percent of the total voting-age population) | verified |
Same Census Table A-1, plotted as two published lines rather than a computed difference, so the drop-off between registering and voting is visible without deriving a new number. Registration was not collected on the same basis in 1964, so that year carries a voting value only. Self-reported throughout.
Primary source: U.S. Census Bureau, Historical Reported Voting Rates, Table A-1 (2024)
What partisans believe about the other side, next to what the other side actually says
| Year | Value | Provenance |
|---|---|---|
| Misperception: share of the other party estimated to hold extreme views, next to the measured share who do | Estimated 55 · actual 30 (percent) | verified |
| Republicans: properly controlled immigration can be good for America | Estimated 52 · actual 85 (percent) | verified |
| Republicans: racism still exists in America | Estimated 51 · actual 79 (percent) | verified |
| Democrats: disagree that most police are bad people | Estimated 48 · actual 85 (percent) | verified |
| Democrats: proud to be American | Estimated 54 · actual 82 (percent) | verified |
| Democrats: disagree the US should have completely open borders | Estimated 38 · actual 71 (percent) | verified |
More in Common, The Perception Gap (June 2019), fielded with YouGov after the 2018 midterms. Each row pairs the share of one party that holds a view with the share the other party estimates. This is a single study rather than a tracked trend, so it carries no year-over-year reading. Later replications exist and are not merged into these figures.
Primary source: More in Common, The Perception Gap (June 2019)